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Abstract 
This paper develops the concepts and methods of a process we will call "alignment of computational models" 
or "docking" for short. Alignment is needed to determine whether two models can produce the same results, 
which in turn is the basis for critical experiments and for tests of  whether one model can subsume another. We 
illustrate our concepts and methods using as a target a model of cultural transmission built by Axelrod. For com- 
parison we use the Sugarscape model developed by Epstein and Axtell. 
The two models differ in many ways and, to date, have been employed with quite different alms. The Axelrod 
model has been used principally for intensive experimentation with parameter variation, and includes only one 
mechanism. In contrast, the Sugarscape model has been used primarily to generate rich "artificial histories," 
scenarios that display stylized facts of interest, such as cultural differentiation d0ven by many different mechansims 
including resource availability, migration, trade, and combat. 
The Sugarscape model was modified so as to reproduce the results of the Axelrod cultural model. Among the 
questions we address are: what does it mean for two models to be equivalent, how can different standards of 
equivalence be statistically evaluated, and how do subtle differences in model design affect the results? After 
attaining a "docking" of the two models, the richer set of mechanisms of the Sugarscape model is used to provide 
two experiments in sensitivity analysis for the cultural rule of Axelrod's model. 
Our generally positive experience in this enterprise has suggested that it could be beneficial if alignment and 
equivalence testing were more widely practiced among computational modelers. 
Keywords: Simulation, replication, computational models, alignment, culture. 
I. Introduction 
1.L Motivation 
I f  computational modeling is to become a widely used tool in social science research, it is 
our belief that a process we will call "alignment of computational models" will be an essential 
activity. Without such a process of close comparison, computational modeling will never 
provide the clear sense of "domain of validity" that typically can be obtained for mathema- 
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tized theories. It seems fundamental to us to be able to determine whether two models 
claiming to deal with the same phenomena can, or cannot, produce the same results. 
Alignment is essential to support two hallmarks of cumulative disciplinary research: criti- 
cal experiment and subsumption. If we cannot determine whether or not two models produce 
equivalent results in equivalent conditions, we cannot reject one model in favor of another 
that fits data better; nor are we able to say that one model is a special case of another more 
general one--as we do when saying Einstein's treatment of gravity subsumes Newton's. 
Although it seems clear that there should be frequent efforts to show pairs of computer 
models to be equivalent, we are aware of only one such case (Anderson and Fischer 1986), 
and we know of no systematic analysis of the issues raised in trying to establish equivalence. 
We have identified a few cases in which an older model has been reprogrammed in a 
new language, sometimes with extensions, by a later author. For example, Michael Prietula 
has reported I reimplementing a model from Cyert and March (1963) and Ray Levitt has 
reported a re implementation of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972)? However, these procedures 
are not comparisons of different models that bear on the same phenomena. Rather they are 
"reimplementations" where a later model is programmed from the outset to reproduce 
as closely as possible the behavior of an earlier model. Our interest is in the more general 
and troublesome case in which two models incorporating distinctive mechanisms bear on 
the same class of social phenomena, be it voting behavior, attitude formation, or organiza- 
tional centralization. 
This paper therefore aims to achieve two goals: 1) to report a novel set of results from 
aligning two different computer models of cultural transmission; and 2) to report an infor- 
mative case study of the process used to obtain these novel results. 
1.2. & e ~ e w  
The paper is organized into six sections. After this brief introductory section, Section 2 
provides more detailed background on the two models necessary for understanding the 
results. The third section reports our procedures in aligning the two models and in collect- 
ing information for this case report. The fourth contains results from two comparison experi- 
ments. The fifth reports our observations on the model alignment process. The conclusion 
is the sixth section. 
2. Background on the Two Models 
Our objective has been to determine if a set of results obtained in a model of cultural trans- 
mission built by Robert Axelrod (1995), could also be obtained in the different setting of 
the Sugarscape model of Joshua M. Epstein and Robert Axtell (1995)? Sugarscape differs 
from the Axelrod model in many ways. Most notably, culture is one of many processes 
that can be operative in the more general Sugarscape system, which has model agents who-- 
among other things--move, eat, reproduce, fight, trade, and suffer disease. The Axelrod 
model has much simpler agents who do none of these things, but rather occupy fixed posi- 
tions on a square plane, interacting only with their immediate neighbors to the North, South, 
East, and West. 4 
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The two models are in this respect clear examples of distinctively different approaches 
to computational modeling: Sugarscape is designed to study the interaction of many differ- 
ent plausible social mechanisms. It is a kind of "artificial world" (Lane 1993). In contrast, 
the Axelrod Culture Model (ACM) was built to implement a single mechanism for a single 
process, with the aim of carrying out extensive experiments varying parameters of that 
mechanism. It much more resembles the spirit of traditional mathematical theorizing in 
its commitment to extreme simplicity and complete analysis of each model parameter. 
We begin by describing briefly how the Axelrod model works? The model studies a square 
array of agents all following a single rule. The agents are cultural entities which might 
be thought of  as "villages." Each agent interacts with a fixed set of neighbors, four unless 
the agent is located on an edge or corner of the square. Each agent has several attributes 
and each of those attributes can take any one of several nominal-scale values. For the work 
reported here we have used five attributes, each taking one of fifteen values. The initial 
state of each agent is determined by randomizing the value of each attribute. Attributes 
might be interpreted as forms of dress, linguistic patterns, religious practices, or other cul- 
turally determined features. 
The central aim of the ACM is to study the effects of a simple mechanism of cultural 
transmission that operates as follows. An agent is selected at random to be the next one 
active. One of the four neighbors is selected to be that agent's next contact. An attribute 
is selected among the five. If the two agents have the same value for that attribute, another 
attribute on which they differ is selected at random, if there are any, and the active agent 
assumes the value for that attribute currently held by the contacted neighbor. Activity is 
allowed to continue until every agent differs from each of its neighbors either at every attri- 
bute or at none. At this point no further change is possible and the model run stops. 
A key feature of this cultural change mechanism is that cultural change becomes more 
likely as two neighbors are more alike, and less likely as they differ. A central question 
of interest in the work with the model is whether this variability of interaction rate is itself 
sufficient to create stable diversity rather than eventual homogeneity--as one would expect 
with a model that allowed unlike neighbors to continue interacting no matter how different 
they were. 
While the ACM can be conveyed in a few paragraphs, and its results can be fully described 
in a short article, Sugarscape is a much more complex system that can be rendered fully 
only at book length (Epstein and Axtell 1995). This is not because individual mechanisms 
of Sugarscape are complex. On the contrary, each of its mechanisms are of about the same 
complexity as in the Axelrod model. However, the intent of Sugarscape is to investigate 
the interplay of many mechanisms as they operate simultaneously--as happens in actual 
social life. In particular, Sugarscape is intended as a tool in sufficiency testing of social 
theories, allowing theorists to ask if  a stipulated set of mechanisms and conditions (say 
for a market to "clear") actually will produce the predicted phenomenon. 
Sugarscape therefore has processes that allow its agents to look for, move to, and eat 
a resource ("sugar") which grows on its toroidal array of cells. Thus while food growing 
cells are immobile, active agents are purposively mobile, and this is one of many fundamental 
differences with the Axelrod model. 
Sugarscape agents also have cultural attributes. In typical studies with the model there 
are eleven cultural attributes, each of which takes one of two values. Cultural attributes 
change in Sugarscape as part of a larger cycle of agent activity. 
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In this model, the agents also become active in random order. 6 Each agent, when active, 
engages in a number of processes. For the present discussion, the most important of these 
is moving to a cell within its vision range that is richest in sugar. At that location an agent 
interacts culturally with all its neighbors. (Sugarscape agents typically do not populate all 
the landscape cells, so the active agent may have fewer than four other agents in its neigh- 
borhood.) In a cultural interaction, an attribute is selected at random, and if the neighbor 
differs from the agent the value is changed to that of the agent. 
In Sugarscape, attributes are aggregated (typically by a simple majority rule) and this 
determines an agent's cultural type, usually labeled as either "Red" or "Blue" Cultural 
type then enters into many other processes in which Sugarscape agents may engage, such 
as trade, combat, and sexual reproduction. 
Whereas the Axelrod model was designed principally for intensive experimentation with 
parameter variation, the intended use of the Sugarscape model is quite different in design. 
In it agents have many behavioral rules in addition to cultural ones, and while the model 
may be used for exploration of parameter spaces, it has heretofore been primarily used 
to generate "artificial histories" scenarios that display stylized facts of interest, such as 
cultural differentiation driven by resource availability, or recognizable patterns of migra- 
tion, trade, and combat. The principal use of the generated scenarios is for sufficiency 
tests, showing that the implemented individual-level mechanisms are able to produce the 
collective-level phenomena of interest. 
I t  should be apparent that the two models are vastly different in many important respects. 
Nonetheless, they have two central features in common that suggest that they could be mean- 
ingfully compared. The first is that both are "agent-based" models. They work by specifying 
properties of individual actors in the system and then studying the collective phenomena that 
result as those individuals interact--in this case in local neighborhoods of two-dimensional 
space. The second shared feature is that both represent cultural attributes of individual 
agents as strings of symbols and model cultural diffusion as a convergence process be- 
tween neighbors. 
3. Procedures of Our Comparison 
These two strong similarities suggested to Axelrod and Cohen, as they read a draft account 
of the Sugarscape project, that it might be possible to "dock" the two models--in analogy 
to orbital docking of dissimilar spacecraft. Thus it could be determined whether Sugarscape, 
under suitable conditions, would produce results equivalent to those already obtained for 
the ACM. Epstein and Axtell were contacted. They agreed such a test would be instructive. 
All four investigators believe that alignment of models will be necessary if computational 
modeling is to become a significant medium of theoretical expression, that Equivalence 
testing could make an important contribution in the social sciences, though it would not 
replace external validity assessment. 7 None of the four could think of a case where such 
an equivalence test had been reported, or where the problem of equivalence testing had 
been analyzed in detail, s 
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3.1. Making the Comparison and Preparing the Case Report 
The four investigators agreed on procedures for conducting the test, and for keeping records 
of the work done and problems encountered in the course of the testing. The aims were: 
1) to determine if equivalent results were produced in equivalent conditions; 2) to demonstrate 
the effects of relaxing some of the equivalent conditions; and 3) to be able to report prob- 
lems that occurred and their resolutions, thus taking first steps in establishing the practice 
of equivalence testing more generally in social science computational modeling. 
The procedures followed were roughly analogous to those used when a second investigator 
in a laboratory science is attempting to reproduce results obtained in a first investigator's 
laboratory (Latour and Woolgar 1979). 
Epstein and Axtell worked with a pre-publication draft account of the ACM to do their 
preliminary work. They considered what steps they would have to take in order to reproduce 
the key results identified by Axelrod. These results show how the number of culturally 
identical regions that exist when stability is reached varies as a function of three parameters: 
the number of attributes, the number of values per attribute, and the size of the square 
lattice. These results included the most surprising aspect of ACM's performance: that the 
equilibrium number of cultural "regions" produced by the model first increases, then de- 
creases as a function of the number of agentsY 
Axtell and Epstein then visited Axelrod and Cohen at the University of Michigan, where 
a conference clarified ambiguities. Further changes were to be made to Sugarscape, and 
then preliminary equivalence tests run. A fuller set of tests was run and analyzed when 
Epstein and Axtell returned to their work site at the Brookings Institution. Epstein and 
Axtell then continued by relaxing some of the factors that had been made equivalent to 
those of ACM, in order to see what differences such changes would make. 
3.2. Testing Model Equivalence 
A central issue was the determination of how to assess "equivalence" of the two models. 
The plan required an effort to show that the Sugarscape model could behave comparably 
to the ACM, and this entails a standard by which to assess "equivalence" of measures made 
on the two models. This was discussed on the telephone and via email at an early stage. 
The conclusion was that for this case it would suffice if Sugarscape could be shown--when 
using a basic cultural transmission mechanism similar to the ACM's--to produce several 
distributions of measurements that were statistically indistinguishable from distributions 
produced by the ACM. 
The four investigators agreed that this is a rather tight standard, since one might argue 
that Sugarscape was equivalent if it produced a set of results with the same ordinal patterns 
as those from the ACM. But a demanding test was felt to be appropriate since this was 
a first exercise of its kind, and since programming changes to Sugarscape could make its 
basic cultural transmission mechanism algorithrnically equivalent to that in ACM. All the 
authors agreed that "equivalence" of models with stochastic elements must be defined in 
context, and further observations on this central and thorny issue are offered in the final 
section. In particular, we expand there on the difficult problem of giving a precise statistical 
content to the concept "statistically indistinguishable distributions." 
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4. Results From the Two Experiments 
We turn now to reporting our observations on the behavior of Sugarscape in comparison 
with that of ACM. We describe the changes made to Sugarscape in order to bring it into 
alignment with what were judged to be principal features determining ACM's results. 
4.1. Changes Made to Dock Sugarscape with ACM 
Vision range was reduced to the immediate four neighbors. Movement range was reduced 
to zero. The usual initialization of Sugarscape to a population sparsely distributed over 
its array of ceils was altered to a distribution placing an agent on every cell. The toroidal 
topology of Sugarscape was altered to a bounded square. There was actually a discrepancy 
introduced in doing this, which we comment on below. The constant numbers of attributes 
and values per attribute in Sugarscape were made into variables that could be set to the 
three different levels used in the ACM runs shown in our Table 1. 
One difference was deemed small and not eliminated. Sugarseape activates agents one 
at a time from a random permutation of the list of agents, When the list is finished, it is 
repermuted and activation begins again. Axelrod, as mentioned, activates a new randomly 
chosen agent every time. Roughly the methods correspond to sampling agents for activa- 
tion without and with replacement. Thus for any given set of n agents, in Sugarscape a 
block of n activations will make each agent active exactly once, while in the Axelrod model 
most would be active once, but a few might be active either zero times or two or more 
times. Our decision not to eliminate this difference, small though it seemed, did have inter- 
esting consequences which we describe below. 
We had decided that to reproduce Axelrod's results Epstein and Axtell should first try 
using exactly his rules for determining cultural change. They therefore programmed a sub- 
stitute for their own cultural change rule, which took no account of inter-agent similarity 
in the diffusion of culture attributes among interacting neighbors, and which caused each 
agent to interact culturally with all its neighbors. 
4.2. Sugarscape Reproduces Central Results of Axelrod's Culture Model 
Table la, with target data from Axelrod (1995), gives the number of stable cultural regions 
for a 10 x 10 lattice, averaged over ten runs, as a function of the number of cultural attri- 
butes and the values per attribute. Note that, other things being equal, the number of cultural 
regions present in equilibrium increases with the number of traits per feature and decreases 
with the number of cultural features. Of the 9 tabulated values, only four are not equal to 1.0. 
A directly analogous display, Table lb, has been generated with the Sugarscape implemen- 
tation of the Axelrod cultural rule. The qualitative dependence of the number of stable 
cultural regions on the number of features and traits per feature is the same as in Axelrod's 
table. Notice that in this new table only three entries are not equal to 1.0. 
Quantitative agreement between the two sets of data is clear for the five entries of 1.0 
that the tables have in common. To test how well the remaining entries in the two tables 
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Table L Average number of stable regions. 
a. Axelrod's Cultural Model 
Features 
b. Sugarscape Implementation 
Feature 
Values/Feature 
5 10 15 
5 1.0 3.2 _+ 1.8 20.0 + 10.1 
10 1.0 1.0 1.4 _+ 0.5 
15 1.0 1,0 1.2 _+ 0.4 
Values/Feature 
5 10 15 
5 1.0 5.3 _+ 3.9 21.3 _+ 12.6 
10 1.0 1.0 1.5 _+ 0.7 
15 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Note: Each cell is based on ten replications. Standard deviations are shown when they are 
not equal to zero. All data are for territories of  10 • 10 sites. 
agree quantitatively, non-parametric statistical comparisons were undertaken. The critical 
value of the two-sided Mann-Whitney U statistic at the 0.05 level of significance for samples 
of size 10 is 23 (Siegel 1956). That is, one rejects the null hypothesis for a value of U 
at or below 23. For all comparisons between the two tables the U-statistics are greater 
than the critical value and thus one cannot reject the null hypothesis on nonparametric 
grounds. Overall, it seems very likely that the corresponding data in the two tables were 
drawn from the same distribution. 
Figure 1 gives the target data from Axelrod (1995) on the number of stable cultural regions 
as a function of the lattice size for five cultural features with fifteen traits per feature. This 
figure has an interesting non-monotonic shape, a result discussed at some length by the 
author. Data for the 5 • 5, 10 • 10 and 20 • 20 lattices have been generated using the 
Sugarseape implementation of the Axelrod cultural rule. In each case, the sample size was 
40, the same sample size used by Axelrod for these three cases. The means from the modi- 
fied Sugarscape model and corresponding error bars are also displayed on Figure 1. To 
determine to what extent this data agrees with Axelrod's original data, we employed the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of the goodness-of-fit of empirical cumulative distribution 
functions (c.f., Hoel 1962)--a nonparametric test. 1~ 
The null hypothesis is that the corresponding data points are drawn from the same distribu- 
tion. At the 5 % significance level, the two-tailed critical value of the K-S statistic with 
forty observations is 0.304. That is, if the actual K-S value exceeds this critical value then 
the null hypotheses is rejected. 
For the two sets of data corresponding to the 5 • 5 lattice the K-S statistic is 0.225. 
Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In the 10 • 10 case the K-S statistic 
is 0.175, and so once again the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Finally the 20 • 20 
lattice size reveals that the K-S statistic is 0.5 > 0.304 and thus the null hypothesis is re- 
jected- the  data for this parameter value appear likely drawn from different distributions. 
The ACM mean in this case was 16.25. The modified Sugarscape mean is 9.23. 
1) In what sense may the computational models still be called "equivalent"? The modified 
Sugarscape model produces results that are numerically identical to those from ACM in 
some cases. It produces distributions of results that cannot be distinguished statistically 
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Legend: 
Solid squares represent the target ACM data for 5 cultural features and 15 traits per feature. Each territory 
size was replicated 40 times, except the territories with 50 • 50 sites and 100 • 100 sites which were replicated 
10 times. 
Open squares represent the Sugarscape data for the same number of features and traits per feature. Each terri- 
torial size (5 • 5, 10 x 10, 20 x 20) was replicated 10 times. 
Open diamonds represent Sugarscape means plus and minus a standard deviation. 
Figure 1, Average number of stable regions in Axelrod's cultural model and Sugarscape implementation. 
from ACM distributions in eleven of  the twelve comparions. In one case it produces a dis- 
tribution that can be distinguished, although the mean is in the desired relationship to the 
other means. That is, the 20 • 20 lattice has a mean number of regions less than the 
10 x 10 case. This non-monotonicity was the important character of the result in Axelrod's  
view of his own results. In our conclusion we argue that these are three natural categories 
of model equivalence, which we call  "numerical  identi ty" "distributional equivalence" 
and "relat ional  equivalence?' We discuss implications of  these distinctions in Section 6. 
2) What  is the likely cause of  the observed difference? Because we had brought so many 
aspects of the two models  into algorithmic agreement,  we were surprised when this dis- 
erepancy occurred. But not all aspects of  the two models agreed, and the statistically signifi- 
cant difference indicates that this mattered in the 20 x 20 case. We believe the difference 
ALIGNING SIMULATION MODELS 131 
arises from our decision not to convert the Sugarscape activation method to the ACM method. 
The Sugarscape method does not allow for the same agent to be occasionally active several 
times before other agents have had their "fair" share of influence. This additional uniform- 
ity of influence appears to be sufficient to induce greater ultimate convergence in cultures, u 
When we convert the activation code in Sugarscape to the "sampling with replacement" 
method of ACM, 20 • 20 case no longer causes a problem. And when all the cases are 
rerun in Sugarscape with random activation, each one of them gives data that are indis- 
tinguishable from the ACM. '2 
3) What is the correct null hypothesis for statistical testing of equivalence? We have con- 
formed in our statistical testing to the usual logic that formulates the problem as rejection 
of a null hypothesis of distributional identity. But the alert reader may have noticed that 
this is not entirely satisfactory in the special circumstances of testing model equivalence. 
With one exception discussed earlier, we have concluded that we cannot reject, at conven- 
tional confidence probabilities, the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same. 
The unsatisfactory aspect of this approach is that it creates an incentive for investigators 
to test equivalence with small sample sizes. The smaller the sample, the higher the thresh- 
old for rejecting the null hypothesis, and therefore the greater the chance of establishing 
equivalence. We have resisted this temptation and used sample sizes typical of simulation 
studies. We feel satisfied in this case that, with the one exception noted, the models behave 
equivalently, In the long run, however, we see a need to formulate a more appropriate sta- 
tistical logic. 13 
4. 3. Sensitivity Analysis of Agent-Based Models 
The literature on sensitivity analysis in agent-based models is, as yet, quite small? 4 How 
do alterations in local rules affect emergent macroscopic structures, such as cultural pat- 
terns? Dockings of the sort we have reported facilitate this new kind of sensitivity analysis. 
Here, we conduct two experiments involving agent movement rules. 
4.3.1 A Mobility Experiment. As noted earlier, "agents" in the ACM occupy fixed posi- 
tions on a square lattice, while in Sugarscape, agents are mobile. One natural question, 
therefore is: what happens to the equilibrium number of cultures in the ACM if agents 
are permitted to move around the Sugarscape interacting with neighbors, with interaction 
governed by the ACM cultural transmission rule? Will we see greater equilibrium cultural 
diversity or less? In the ACM, there is zero probability that non-neighboring agents will 
directly interact, while in Sugarscape, depending on the landscape topography, any two 
agents might eventually interact directly. Since the effect of movement is therefore to "mix" 
the population, we would expect that eventually there would be less diversity than without 
movement. This is what we find. 
In order to carry out the experiment the Sugarscape was configured as a 50 x 50 grid 
having a single (Gaussian) "sugar mountain" in the center. One hundred mobile agents 
were given random initial locations on this landscape. Each agent engages in purposive 
behavior as follows: 1) it searches locally for the lattice location having the most sugar; 
2) it moves to the nearest best site and 3) it gathers (eats) the sugar on that site. The agent 
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population is heterogeneous with respect to its vision, i.e., how far each agent can "see" 
locally in the principal lattice directions (north, south, east and west). In these runs vision 
was uniformly distributed between 5 and 10 in the agent population. After moving agents 
engage in cultural exchange--here according to Axelrod's cultural exchange rule--with one 
of their neighbors. One important difference between the Sugarscape and the ACM is that 
agents may have anywhere from 0 to 4 neighbors on the Sugarscape while (non-boundary) 
agents always have exactly 4 neighbors in the ACM. Once sugar is "harvested" by the agents 
it grows back at unit rate. The "termination criterion" employed had to be modified some- 
what for this run. In the case of fixed agents, cultural transmission terminates when all 
neighboring agents are either completely identical or completely different. With mobile 
agents it is necessary to check whether all agents are either completely the same or com- 
pletely different, independent of whether or not they are neighbors. This "global" stopping 
criterion is computationaUy more expensive than the "local" one appropriate for fixed agents. 
Since we expected movement to reduce the number of cultures present it seemed natural 
to test the proposition using the parameters which yielded the most cultures in the ACM. 
In the case of 100 agents (10 • 10 grid) having 5 cultural features and 15 traits/feature, 
the ACM produced an average of 20.0 (s.d. + 10.1) distinct cultures, while the Sugarscape 
version of the ACM (fixed agents) yielded 21.3 (___ 12.5). The introduction of movement 
dramatically reduces the number of cultures. Over a sample of 10 runs in Sugarscape the 
average was 1.1 (+0.3). When the experiment was repeated for the case of 5 features-30 
traits/feature, under the expectation that this larger "cultural space" would yield more distinct 
cultures in equilibrium, the average number of cultures present in Sugarscape increased 
somewhat to 2.2 (_+1.2). 
4.3.2. A "'Soup" Experiment. Movement mixes the population. The extreme form of this is 
the so-called "soup" in which agents are paired at random regardless of location, and then 
interact under the ACM rule. Since this results in more thorough mixing than movement, 
we would expect the "culturally homogenizing" effect to be even stronger. And it was. 
For 100 agents having 5 cultural features and 15 traits/feature, in 10 runs there was never 
a case in which more than 1 culture remained. When the number of traits/feature was in- 
creased to 30, a sequence of 10 runs yielded 7 runs which ended up with a single culture, 
2 instances of 2 distinct cultures and a single case of 3 equilibrium cultures; an average 
of 1.4 overall. Essentially, most of the ACM's cultural diversity disappears in soup. In sum- 
mary, the more well-mixed the society, the lower is the equilibrium number of distinct 
cultures. Relatedly, multi-cultural equilibria in the ACM require that the probability of in- 
teraction between completely different agents be literally zero. If there is any probability 
of interaction (or if there is any point mutation rate) the long-run attractor is one culture. 
The above points concern the number of equilibria only; can we say anything about the 
rates at which these set in? 
Recall the basic dynamic of the ACM: the greater the similarity between neighboring 
agents, the more rapidly does their similarity grow. Once similarity reaches a certain state, 
convergence is rapid--almost as if a phase transition occurs. Now, the counterintuitive result 
is that the more well-mixed the society, the later is this "phase transition" In the ACM 
model local dusters of neighboring agents develop similarities. Their high spatial correla- 
tion permits these agents to arrive at "agreement" very quickly, while in the Sugarscape 
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mobility case, agents "hop away" before agreement is possible; and in the extreme soup, 
where spatial correlation is zero, the "phase change" is later still. In summary, the lower 
the spatial correlation the later is the onset of rapid convergence to equilibrium, and the 
lower is the equilibrium number of cultures. 
5. Results on the Docking Process Itself 
5.1. The Docking Process 
When Epstein and Axtell visited the University of Michigan they brought their model with 
them on a portable computer. A portion of the work needed for the equivalence testing was 
done prior to their arrival. This encompassed most of the changes described in Section 4.1. 
Fortunately, Sugarscape was programmed in Object Pascal and with considerable atten- 
tion to generality. It was therefore possible to make most of these changes as substitutions 
of parameter values or by "throwing switches." 
On their arrival in Ann Arbor, a meeting was held to resolve several ambiguities that 
remained on the basis of reading Axelrod's text. We note an implication of this: under cur- 
rent standards of reporting a simulation model it will often not be possible to resolve all 
questions for an alignment exercise. Thus it will be necessary either to contact the author 
of the target model, to have access to the source code, or to have access to a documentation 
of the target model more complete than is generally provided in accounts published in con- 
temporary journals. 
The meeting also determined what steps were to be taken next. Axtell spent an evening 
doing additional programming. The next day it was possible to run a number of cases that 
would be needed to build a Sugarscape version of the Axelrod results. 
Two months later while preparing to write up the results, Axtell realized that another 
change was necessary for the docking. Whereas the ACM altered the active agent when 
a cultural borrowing happened, the original Sugarscape model altered the agent's neighbor. 
This made a subtle difference because agents on the edge of the territory have fewer neigh- 
bors than those in the interior. To be sure that every site had the same chance to change, 
the ACM method is needed. When this was realized, Axtell made the necessary change to 
the Sugarscape implementation, and generated the data shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
5.2. Total Time Required 
The various tasks entailed in this docking exercise and the experimental extensions of the 
ACM are listed in the Appendices. These two appendices provide a description of the specific 
tasks undertaken by Axelrod and Axtell respectively, along with the times required for each. 
All told, the work took about 23 hours for Axelrod and 37 hours for Axtell. is 
5.3. Factors Making This Case Relatively Easy 
There are at least four factors that can be identified as contributing to the relative ease with 
which the equivalence test was accomplished. First, the Sugarscape program was written 
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from the outset with the objective of maximizing generality and ease of change. These 
goals are not especially easy to attain in practice, but object-oriented programming cer- 
tainly did help. 
A second positive contributing factor is the extreme simplicity of the Axelrod model. 
This allowed the prose description to be essentially complete, and had ACM contained as 
many processes as Sugarscape it would have been considerably more difficult to bring the 
two so fully into alignment. 
A third factor was the recency of the ACM project. The statistical comparison required 
the full 210 points underlying the results reported in the original article. 17 These were rela- 
tively easy for the original investigator to provide, and this might not be so in other cases. 
A fourth factor, already mentioned briefly, is the underlying agreement of the two models 
on a basic, "agent-oriented" framework. In the absence of that, the architectures of the 
two models might have been so different as to make the project inconceivable. 
5. 4. Factors Making This Case Relatively Hard 
On the other side of the ledger, there are several factors in the situation of this case study 
that probably made the exercise more difficult than future cases might be. Foremost among 
these is the probability that in the future models may be built with a prospect of equivalence 
testing clearly in view. ACM did not exist when Sugarscape was designed. Thus demon- 
strating equivalence to the ACM was not among its design specifications. If it had been, 
the equivalence testing could have been simpler still. 
Also, one can plausibly imagine that there may someday be a number of more standard- 
ized code modules available which are reused in successive modeling projects. Random 
number generators meet this criterion today, and more substantive model elements may do 
so in the future. This too could substantially decrease costs of equivalence testing. 
Overall, we would say that we did not find it completely straightforward to align the two 
models. But we were able to accomplish it in the end. And while the difficulties we encoun- 
tered in reconciling them may seem disquieting, we should recall that they are not without 
precedent. Differential and integral calculus produced different results in the hands of dif- 
ferent investigators until the foundations were solidified in the 19th century by the work of 
Cauchy and Weierstrass (Kramer, 1970). And what is the alternative to confronting these 
difficulties, to look away and rest our theorizing on unverified assumptions of equivalence? 
6. Observations on the Value and Difficulties of Alignment 
We conclude with some further observation on three matters: whether the face-to-face meet- 
ing we used in this alignment effort is likely to be typical; how we might label different 
approaches to defining "equivalence"; and a brief proposal for the use of equivalence tests 
in evaluations made of journal submissions and research funding proposals. 
There is one point at which the process we report might not be typical of alignments 
that would be done in the future, if this kind of analysis were to become more common. 
It is that a meeting, such as Epstein and Axtell had with Axelrod, might not be necessary 
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in general. The meeting that was held served two functions: establishing details about the 
procedure of alignment and clarifying ambiguous aspects of the ACM. If the situation were 
one of comparison to a published model situated in an established line of research the former 
issues might be decided entirely by the author of a new model who seeks to establish its 
equivalence to an older one. This situation is one that we imagine might become more usual. 
The second function of the meeting, resolving ambiguities about the construction of the 
target model, is not one that we imagine as likely to go away. On the contrary, many target 
models will be considerably more complex than the ACM. However, it may also be true 
that those attempting to show a new model equivalent to an old one will have source code 
for the old one--a resource which was deliberately not employed in this case. It may also 
be true that the criteria of equivalence may be looser than they were in this case, a point 
we discuss below. 
Considering all these factors, our impression is that good alignments can be made with- 
out actual meetings of model authors. This will be all the more likely if authors who report 
their models begin to assume that alignments may later be tried and thus become careful 
about providing information that may be essential to such efforts. We emphasize that 1) a 
precise, detailed statement of how the model works is critical, and 2) that distributional 
information about reported measurements is necessary if statistical methods to test equiva- 
lence are to be employed by a later investigator. 
As we noted above, the problem of specifying what will be taken as "equivalent" model 
behavior is by no means trivial. Our reflections on it suggest that there are at least two 
categories of equivalence beyond the obvious criterion of numerical identity, which will 
not be expected in any models that have stochastic elements. We call these two categories 
"distributional" and "relational" equivalence. By distributional equivalence we mean a 
showing that two models produce distributions of results that cannot be distinguished statis- 
ticaUy. This is the level of equivalence we eventually chose to test for in our case. By "rela- 
tional equivalence" we mean that the two models can be shown to produce the same inter- 
nal relationship among their results. For example, both models might show a particular 
variable is a quadratic function of time, or that some measure on a population decreases 
monotonically with population size. 
Clearly, relational equivalence will generally be a "weaker," less demanding, test. But 
for many theoretical purposes it may suffice. And distributional equivalence may sometimes 
be possible only with alignment of parametric details of the two models that would be quite 
laborious to achieve. 
Finally, our generally positive experience in this enterprise has suggested to us that it 
could be beneficial if alignment and equivalence testing were more widely practiced among 
computational modellers. It can be done within the reasonable effort level of a few days 
or weeks work--possibly less if it is planned for from the outset. And the consequences 
are quite large. The Sugarscape group can now say with confidence that their model can 
be modified to reproduce the ACM results, and they point to specific mechanisms of Sugar- 
scape which are sufficient to change the effect of the ACM transmission mechanism. This 
begins to build confidence that other results with Sugarscape may be robust over potential 
variation in the specifics of its cultural transmission process. 
Readers of papers on Sugarscape and the ACM can now have a clearer conception of 
how they related to each other. And future modellers of cultural transmission will have 
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a clearer understanding of the likely consequences of different transmission mechanisms. 
In short, the interested community obtains from such an exercise an improved sense of 
the robustness, the range of plausibility, of model results. And points of difference have 
been established which could allow empirical evidence to discriminate between the models. 
These are major hallmarks of cumulative disciplinary theorizing that are unavailable with- 
out alignment of models. 
We are led to the suggestion that it might be valuable if authors of computational models 
knew they would receive credit for having made such alignments. If reviewers of journal 
and research grant submissions were encouraged to give substantial positive weight to such 
demonstrations, and authors knew of this policy, the effects could be dramatic. Among 
other things, this would create an incentive to establish a model in an area of inquiry that 
could readily serve as a "benchmark" for comparisons by later models. The result might 
well be more--and more extensive--families of computational models displaying an explicit 
and clear network of relations to each other. This would be an important gain over the 
current situation in which, with a small number of exceptions, each model has been con- 
structed entirely de novo. 
Computational modeling offers a striking opportunity to fashion miniature worlds, and 
this appeals to powerful creative impulses within all of us. William Blake expressed this 
deep need writing in his Jerusalem (1804/1974, pl. 10, 1.20). 
"I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Man's; I will not Reason and Com- 
pare: my business is to Create." 
But if these wonderful new possibilities of computational modeling are to become intel- 
lectual tools well-harnessed to the requirements of advancing our understanding of social 
systems, then we must overcome the natural impulse for self-contained creation and carefully 
develop the methodology of using them to "Reason and Compare" 
Appendix 1. Axelrod's Work Log 
ALL Design of the Replication Study 
1. Discussion with Cohen about the general idea of the replication experiment, including the 
suitability of my cultural model and Sugarscape for this purpose. (hours:minutes. 3:00) 
2. Writing letter to Axtell and Epstein specifying what we came to call the docking experi- 
ment, including the choice of data points to be compared. (Cohen had already discussed 
the idea with them in Vienna.) (1:00) 
3. Trip arrangements for Axtell and Epstein. (1:00) 
4. Discussion among all four of us of the docking experiment and its motivation, especially 
the importance of doing what we came to call distributional equivalence, rather rela- 
tional equivalence. (1.00) 
5. Discussion among all four of us about the details of Axelrod's cultural model. This in- 
cluded discussion about the sentence that said "the chance of interaction is proportional 
to the cultural similarity two neighbors already have" where cultural similarity is the 
proportion of attributes which have the same value. Axtell had implemented this literally, 
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but I pointed out that I actually used a more efficient (and equivalent) method, namely 
to allow interaction i f  a single randomly chosen attribute has the same value. (1:00) 
6. Preliminary specification of what became the mobility experiment. See Section 4.3.1. 
(2:00). 
Subtotal: 9:00 
Al.2. Data Analysis 
1. Extraction of key raw data from my old computer output for Axtell to use in comparing 
my data to his. (1:00) 
2. Communications with Axtell about receiving his data, and updating it after he corrected 
for changing the agent rather than the neighbor. See Section 5.1. (2:30) 
3. Discussions with Cohen and a statistical consultant, Pat Guire, on proper statistical test- 
ing. (3:00) 
4. Putting Axtell's data in a format comparable to mine, and calculating basic statistics. 
(2:00) 
5. Consideration of alternative possible reasons why the original attempt at docking did 
not succeed for the 20 • 20 case. Development of tests of these possibilities (e.g. a 
bug in my code or Axtell's code), and identification of the likely cause as differences 
in the activation methods. See Section 4.2. (5:30). 
Subtotal: 14:00 
Grand Total: 23:00 
Appendix 2. Axteli's Work Log 
A2.1. Code Changes Accomplished in Ann Arbor 
1. Generalize culture representation from type BOOLEAN to an enumerated type (Hours: 
Minutes, 0:10) 
2. Change agent initialization: 
A. Fill lattice densely with agents (0:20) 
B. Give agents random initial cultures (0:20) 
3. Implement a version of Axelrod's culture rule (01:00) 
4. Draw boundaries between agents not culturally identical (0:30) 
5. New stopping criterion (0:15) 
6. Count distinct cultures (surrogate for counting regions) (0:15) 
7. Switch landscape from torus to square negligible (<0:01) 
8. Turn-off all other Sugarscape rules negligible (<0:01) 
9. Debugging all of above (1:00) 
Sub-total: 3:50 
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A2.2. Subsequent Code Modifications 
1. Modify neighborhood representation so that agents on the border of the lattice do not 
attempt to interact with non-existent (NIL) neighbors (0:30) 
2. Represent regions as social networks and then use "clique_size" of social network ob- 
ject to count regions (this obviated the need for #6 above) (0:30) 
3. File output of number of cultural regions (0:10) 
Sub-total: 1:10 
A2.3. Running the Model 
1. Make executable files for various parameter settings (0:40) 
2 .90  runs for comparison to Axelrod's data on features and values/feature. See Table 1. 
(2:00) 
3. 120 runs for comparison to Axelrod's data on lattice size. See Figure 1. (8:00) 
Sub-total: 10:40 
A2.4. Statistical Comparison 
I. Development of Mann-Whitney U test in Mathematica (2:00) 
2. Analysis of data using the Mann-Whitney U test (1:00) 
3. Development of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) analysis routines in Mathematica (4:00) 
4. Analysis of data using K-S test (2:00) 
Sub-total: 9:00 
A2.A Mobility Experiment: See Section 4.3.1 
1. Modify the stopping criteria to consider agent interactions with the entire population 
(0:10) 
2. Time series plot for the distinct number of cultures (1:00) 
3. Instantiate a standard version of the Sugarscape with the Epstein-Axtetl culture rule re- 
placed by Axelrod's (0:10) 
4. Make executable file (0:05) 
5. Perform multiple runs of this model (1:00) 
Sub-total: 2:25 
A2.6 "'Pure Soup" Experiment: See Section 4. 3.2 
1. Instantiate soup version of the Sugarscape with Axelrod's culture rule (0:10) 
2. Make executable file (0:05) 
3. Perform multiple realizations of this model (1:00) 
Sub-total: 1:15 
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A2.7. Re-docking: See Section 4.2 
1. Change agent activation from sequential to random (0:10) 
2. Re-run the model (40 runs) (8:00) 
3. Analysis of new data (0:20) 
Sub-total: 8:30 
Grand total: 36:50 
Acknowledgments 
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from The Brookings Institution, 
World Resources Institute, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Santa Fe 
Institute, The Program for the Study of Complex Systems, and the LS&A Enrichment Fund 
of the University of Michigan, and the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Administration. 
Notes 
1. Personal communication to Michael Cohen. 
2. Personal communication to Michael Cohen. 
3. Axelrod's source code is approximately 1500 lines of Pascal for the Macintosh (Synamtec THINK Pascal 
version 4.0.1) and is available from the author. The Sugarscape source code is approximately 20,000 lines 
of Object Pascal and C for the 68K Macintosh (Symantec THINK Pascal version 4.0.2 and THINK C version 
7.0.6 compilers). Agent objects are written in Pascal while low-level and graphics routines are primarily written 
in C. This code is available from Robert Axtell. Executable versions of the code, configured with Axelrod's 
culture rule and capable of generating the data in this paper, are also available from Axtell. 
4. Other models of cultural transmission and social influence include Renfrew (1973), Sabloff (1981), Nowak, 
Szamrej and Latane (1990), Freidkin and Johnsen (1990), Putnam (1966), March (1991), Harrison and Carol 
(1991), Carley (1991), and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1991). See also Axelrod (1995). 
5. A complete account of the model structure and of results obtained from experiments can be found in Axelrod 
(1995). 
6. The method is similar, but not identical, to that in ACM, as discussed below. 
7. On external validation see Dutton and Starbuck (1971), Knepell and Arangno (1993) and Burton and Obel 
(1995). 
8. Subsequent search did uncover one such report: Anderson and Fischer (1986). Thus far no systematic treat- 
ment of the conceptual issues has been found. 
9. Axelrod defined a cultural region as a set of contiguous sites with identical culture. 
10. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was not used for the comparisons in Table 1 because it has low power for 
small sample sizes. 
11. A possibly related result is obtained below in Section 4.3, where it is shown that allowing agents to mix 
with non-neighbors also reduces the eventual equilibrium number of cultures. 
12. Sugarscape with random activation gives means and non-zero standard deviations as follows. For Table 1, 
reading across 1.2 4- 0.4,4.10 4- 1.3, 18.8 4- 9.7, 1.0, 1.0, 1.9 + 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0. The Mann-Whitney 
U statistics for these 9 sets of data of ten data points do not reject the nuU hypothesis that these data are 
drawn from the same underlying distributions as Table 1, at the 0.05 level of significance. For Figure 1, the 
data are 9.8 + 2.8 (for 5 • 5 case), 20.4 + 7.9 (for 10 • 10 case), and 14.8 _4- 7.0 (for 20 • 20 case). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for these 3 data sets of 40 points each do not reject the hypothesis that 
these data have the same distributions as the corresponding distributions from Axelrod's Culture Model shown 
in Figure 1. 
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13. Our current view of the most promising direction is to reverse the usual null hypothesis formulation and 
ask whether we can confidently reject the claim that the distributions are different. However, there are two 
complications in this approach. First, with stochastic models it will be extremely hard to conclude that all 
the observed difference in sample means is due to sampling fluctuation. This suggests that it will be necessary 
to use a null hypothesis such as "the two distributions differ by no more than X percent;' with X chosen 
by convention or to be appropriate within the referent context. Second, with such a reversed and non-simple 
null hypothesis, and with no solid reason to assume a convenient (e.g., Gaussian) form of the underlying 
distributions, it is unlikely that there will be a manageable analytic method of obtaining confidence levels 
for the statistics. This suggests that the problem will have to be attacked with computational statistical tools, 
such as the bootstrap approach of Efron and Tibshirani (1993). 
14. For an example based on cellular automata see V~ensche and Lesser (1992). 
15. These numbers do not include the time spent by all four participants in writing this report. 
16. It should also be said that Axtell, the lead programmer on Sugarscape, is a relatively skilled practitioner. 
He does not have experience producing commercial quality code, but his training did include doctoral level 
course work in computer science. 
17. There were 10 runs for each of the 9 cases in Table 1, and 40 runs from each of the 3 eases used for com- 
parison from Figure 1. 
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